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ABSTRACT 
 
The economic sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation as a response to the 
illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine by the United States 
of America and the European Union throughout the 2014 did not manage to 
achieve practical results as the military actions in Eastern Ukraine are still in the 
active phase and Crimea remains part of Russia. Thus, the ultimate goal of this 
thesis is to propose the alternative methods for the solution of this problem, which 
use certain economic measures as the instruments that could influence the 
decision-making process in regard to the foreign policy.  
The deductive approach is used in this thesis and the research method is mostly 
quantitative for the empirical part, with qualitative method used in the analytical 
part. The data is collected from the secondary sources such as books, articles, 
journals, reports and the internet. 
The core of this thesis consists of the three main parts. First, Russia’s national 
economy is analyzed from the structural point of view in order to understand its 
specifics. Then, the technical results achieved by the imposed sanctions are 
reviewed and the weaknesses are highlighted. Lastly, several alternative solutions 
are suggested for the implementation with detailed advantages presented for each 
one. 
As a result, this thesis concludes that the proposed alternative solutions are 
feasible and effective from the practical perspective as they indeed serve the 
initial purpose of using the economic measures as an instrument for the influence 
over the decision making process in the field of politics. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background information 
Shortly afterwards the ousted President Viktor Yanukovich flees Ukraine, Pro-
Russian armed men take control of the main administrative buildings in Crimea 
and the Crimean Parliament sets a date for a referendum that will decide the future 
and the legal status of the Peninsula (Dearden 2014). On 16 March 2014 96.77% 
of the electorate voted in favor of secession from Ukraine and the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea joined Russia as a federal subject. It is believed that the 
Crimean Tatars that comprise around 12% of the Peninsula’s Muslim minority 
were intimidated during the referendum (Adesnik 2014). Moreover, the 
referendum ballot did not include the option for Crimea retaining its status quo by 
being autonomy and remaining part of Ukraine. One of the options was the one 
chosen by the majority of the voters and the other was the restoration of the 
constitution of 1992 that would allow Crimea to stay independent within Ukraine 
and have the right to determine its legal status (Balmforth 2014). Five days before 
the referendum took place, the OSCE stated that it was illegal as it was in 
contradiction with the constitution of Ukraine and refused to participate in the 
observation of such referendum (OSCE Chair says Crimean referendum in its 
current form is illegal and calls for alternative ways to address the Crimean issue 
2014). On 18 March President Vladimir Putin signs a document that formally 
recognizes Crimea as part of Russian Federation (Putin signs Crimea annexation 
into law 2014).  
Russian annexation of Crimea violated the Budapest Memorandum that served as 
the ultimate guarantee of Ukraine’s sovereignty all these years from 1994 when it 
was signed until 2014(Harres 2014). The reaction of the international community 
was expressed during the General Assembly of the United Nations on 27 March 
2014 with 100 countries voting in favor of recognizing Ukrainian sovereignty, 
political independence and territorial integrity and underscoring the Crimean 
referendum invalid. 58 countries of total 193 abstained from voting with 11 
countries voting against such a resolution (General Assembly Adopts Resolution 
Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region 2014). 
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As a response for the Crimean annexation, the first round of sanctions was 
imposed on 17 March 2014 by the USA freezing the assets and introducing travel 
bans of 11 officials and the EU 21 officials respectively (Myers, Baker 2014). 
Sanctions also included the suspension of diplomatic cooperation on visa matters 
between Russia and the EU (Öztürk 2015).  
On 28 April the USA imposed further sanctions by expanding the list introduced 
during the first round of sanctions and banning business transaction with 
Government officials and 17 Russian companies (U.S. levels new sanctions 
against Russian officials, companies 2014). The EU expanded the list of total 
officials whose assets are to be frozen with travel bans implemented to 45 persons 
(EU strengthens sanctions against actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity 2014).   
The military actions in the Eastern Ukrainian region of Donbass between the 
armed pro-Russian separatist and Ukrainian Armed Forces began in April 2014 
(Kirby 2015) and by June 2014 Ukrainian Army did not control a significant part 
of the border between Russia and Ukraine (Alpert 2014) thus allowing the tanks 
and other heavy weaponry to be supplied by Russia to separatists as believed by 
the US Government (Dyeg 2014). The Ukrainian Armed Forces have discovered 
documents proving the Russian origin of the military equipment in the regions 
that were liberated from the separatist control (Russia’s Continuing Support for 
Armed Separatists in Ukraine and Ukraine’s Efforts Toward Peace, Unity, and 
Stability 2014).  
As the military actions continued, on 17 July the third round of sectorial sanctions 
was issued by the US and it targeted two major Russian banks Vnesheconombank 
and Gazprombank and two Russia energy giants Rosneft and Novatek (Further 
US and EU Sanctions on Russian Persons 2014). The EU imposed its own tougher 
sanctions on 31 July by prohibiting the business transactions between EU and 
Russian banks such as: Sberbank, VTB Bank, Rosselkhozbank and two more 
banks already sanctioned by the US. The EU had also banned the exports of 
specific equipment that may be used in Russia’s energy sector (Stocker, Austin 
2014). On 7 August Russia imposed its own retaliatory sanctions in a form of a 
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food embargo that banned to imports of various foods, agricultural products and 
raw materials that have EU or US origin (Nielsen 2014). 
The additional sanctions introduced on 11 September by the US prohibited the 
domestic banks to issue debts to Sberbank and Rostec and domestic companies to 
cooperate with Gazprom, Gazpromneft, LukOIL, SurgutNefteGaz and Rosneft in 
oil industry and to service those (Mohammed, Trott 2014). Nevertheless, 
regardless of the sanctions imposed and attempts for a ceasefire, the fighting 
between pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian Armed Forces continues today 
(Baczynska 2015).  
1.2 Thesis objectives and research question 
The main objective of this thesis is to propose practically viable alternative 
solutions that direct the economic measures to serve as the instruments of 
influence over the political decision making. Furthermore, this thesis defines the 
ultimate framework for dealing with the problems arising from the precedents of 
similar kind within the field of international politics, economics and diplomacy in 
the near and distant future. Moreover, the thesis responds to the need of finding 
new ways for the enforcement of the international treaties, agreements and 
memorandums in order to keep the peace and stability around the globe. Finally, 
the thesis seeks to create the tools for controlling the military aggression and 
avoiding the war at any cost. 
Research Question: What measures need to be taken in order to influence the 
decision making in regard to Russia’s foreign policy? 
These sub-questions are aimed at clarifying the nature of the research question: 
- To what extent is the trade with the Eurasian partners important? 
- What is the role of Russia’s private sector from the political and economic 
perspective? 
- What is the influence of the public opinion on the foreign policy? 
- What is the importance of Russia’s gas transporting infrastructure from the 
political perspective? 
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1.3 Thesis structure 
For better understanding the structure of this thesis is divided into six main 
chapters and is organized as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Thesis structure 
The beginning gives an insight to the background of the situation and introduces 
the whole picture prior to the research. Then, the second chapter tells more 
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
NATIONAL ECONOMY OF RUSSIA 
HISTORY OF SANCTIONS 
CONCLUSION 
ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
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specifically about the examples of economic sanctions imposed on various 
countries in history having covered the cold war era and trade restrictions on 
USSR. In addition to that it evaluates the results achieved by those sanctions 
throughout the history. Chapter 3 reviews Russian national economy in details by 
discovering the main sources of its GDP, the leading sectors of the economy and 
current state of the oil and gas infrastructure. The fourth chapter includes the 
empirical part and involves the analysis of Russia’s economic activity with respect 
to their performance before and after the sanctions as well as presumes the 
theoretical projections of Russia’s GDP in the future with respect to international 
oil prices and fluctuations of Russian Ruble. The next chapter proposes the 
alternative solutions to this problem and therefore focusing on sanctioning 
Russia’s private sector and reviewing the potential for trade restrictions within the 
Eurasian Economic Union as well as highlighting the vital importance of the 
Turkish Stream gas transportation project. The last chapter summarizes all the 
findings and assumptions together with facts and finalizes the work. 
1.4 Research methodology 
Research Approach 
The two most commonly known approaches used in the process of building the 
academic paper are inductive and deductive. Whereas the deductive approach is 
centered on the idea of generating the theory first and then testing it through 
empirical observation, the inductive approach, on the contrary, exist in the 
reversed form of the former and the final theory is being built with respect to the 
real life empirical observations made. (Lancaster 2005, 22-26.) 
Therefore, in this thesis the deductive approach will be used. 
Research Method 
The collection and the analysis of data in a research paper are conducted either 
quantitatively or qualitatively. Nevertheless, sometimes the distinction between 
those two methods is not as clear as it seems. (Lancaster 2005, 159.) 
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Qualitative method usually involves collection of data through a case study or 
conduction of interviews where author intends to build his theory based on the 
information extracted from the participant. Therefore, it is important to mention 
that the results of such research depend on the researcher and the participant. On 
the contrary, the quantitative method does not leave a room for any personal 
experiences or bias of the researcher and the results tend to be more generalized 
and objective (Harwell 2011, 147-150). In this thesis a combination of both 
methods will be used. The statistical part involving the numerical data on such 
matters as economic performance will be organized quantitatively, whereas 
regards of public opinion and similar matters will be assessed qualitatively.  
Data Collection 
The nature of data necessary for the research of this thesis will be secondary due 
to the specific nature of the subject and associated difficulties in the collection of 
the primary data without visiting Russian Federation. The secondary data from 
official government sources will be extracted for the analysis of such matters as: 
Russia’s economic performance, the currency fluctuations, adjustments in federal 
budget due to the fall of the international oil prices, the movement of financial 
capital with respect to the foreign direct investments and purchasing power parity. 
1.5 Thesis scope, limitations and newness 
Key Theoretical Premises 
The key theoretical premise of this thesis is to underline the use of economic 
sanctions as an instrument to achieve political effect. Nevertheless, it is important 
to emphasize the absolute difference between the mentality of those who crafted 
the sanctions and those who they were imposed on being the USA, the EU, Japan 
and other G7 members on the one hand and Russian Federation on the other hand 
respectively. The various factors that were responsible for the shaping of the 
national culture and the ability to perceive certain things and react in specific 
situation will be examined with national history being given the central role. In 
other words, the collective measures adopted by the Western World on Russia did 
not succeed because they were not adapted accordingly. Finally, the scope of the 
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thesis will be further limited to the idea of mobilization of natural forces in a way 
that would encourage ordinary Russian citizens to participate actively in their 
country’s political and civil life, bear responsibility for the consequences of their 
Government’s foreign policy and start being involved in decision making.  
Limitations  
The main limitation of this study is the nature of its sources as most of them will 
be internet based due to the newness of the research and unavailability of 
published ones. Another important limitation will be the origin of statistical 
sources as a significant number of them will be taken from Russian National 
statistical agencies and therefore may possibly lack certain level of credibility. 
Lastly, this thesis lacks any primary data and therefore is based on the data from 
secondary sources. 
Newness 
As this study focuses on the events that began in the beginning of 2014 and are 
still in their active phase, there is a great chance that there are not a large number 
of similar researches done in this field, if any. However, it is considered new not 
only from the historical point of view. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is 
uniquely new due to the fact that both parties were the founding states of the 
USSR and CIS consequently.  
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2 HISTORY OF SANCTIONS 
2.1 Examples 
The concept of sanctions is not new in our world with the earliest known example 
being the “Megarian Decree” issued by the Athenian politician Pericles on the 
merchants from Megara, thus barring them from the domestic market (Lendering 
2005). Nevertheless, this chapter will focus on the three famous examples that are 
the Continental System, International Sanctions on Iran and the Trade Embargo 
on the Soviet Union. 
2.1.1 Continental System 
One of the earliest examples is the Continental System imposed by the French 
Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte on the British Empire in order to damage the 
British economy and limit its trading potentials. Allies of France and other nations 
that were neutral during the Napoleonic Wars were ordered to stop trading with 
Britain although the practical success of such system was undermined by the 
superiority of British Naval Forces (Continental System). In other words, the 
implementation of these sanctions and compliance of other nations was not as 
easy as nowadays partly due to the fact that France at that time was not considered 
hegemony of the world in terms of economic and military power as according to 
some suggestions, modern day developed economies were representing only 
around 20% of the world’s GDP (The new titans 2006). Eventually, it was Russia 
which refused to follow the orders of the Continental System from 1810 onwards 
and it resulted in French invasion of Russian Empire in 1812 (The Continental 
System 2013).  
In this example the sanctions imposed were one of the ways to weaken the enemy 
during the war and were aimed at defeating Great Britain by restricting its 
commercial might first. The practical result of the Continental System cannot be 
overestimated as the events that followed later were catastrophic for a number of 
states, particularly the issuer, target country and the main stakeholders, namely 
French, British and Russian Empires. The all-European war waged by the 
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coalition against France had a direct effect on its neighboring countries with 
number of them being liberated from the French control, as we know from the 
general history course, and new balance of power emerging in Europe. To be 
precise, although the Continental system may have affected British trade and 
commerce, the sanctions imposed by Napoleon did not help him to win the war, 
and therefore, it can be stated that such sanctions were not successful and the ends 
did not justify the means. The unemployment and a number of bankruptcies were 
the result of Continental System for Great Britain, whereas for the French 
controlled Holland and German states it resulted in high prices as import tariffs 
were placed on the colonial products (Grant, Temperley & Ramm 1984, 109 – 
110).  
2.1.2 International Sanctions on Iran 
The more recent example could be the sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. In 2007, the USA introduced a set of sanctions that targeted Iranian banks, 
military entities namely the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Quds as 
well as certain persons that were engaged in the uranium enriching activities 
(Koch, Labott 2007). It was believed that between the years 2006 and 2007 Iran 
built a facility that was intended for the uranium enrichment activities (Fordow 
Fuel Enrichment Plant). The US Department of State had accused Iran of planning 
to use the enriched uranium for the nuclear weapons and those allegations were 
the main reason behind the sanctions as such militarization was considered as a 
threat to peace and stability in the Middle East.  
Here, the sanctions were imposed in order to punish the Islamic Republic of Iran 
for their refusal to comply with the United Nations resolutions and their denial for 
observations from the International Atomic Energy Agency (Lappin 2007). In 
other words, economic and diplomatic measures were aimed at changing Iran’s 
political line in regard to their uranium enrichment program. Six years later, when 
Hassan Rouhani won the election and became the President of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran he proposed a new diplomatic approach in dealings with the USA 
and the EU over the matters of Iran’s nuclear program which many believed 
would end the political stand-off that escalated during the presidency of Mahmoud 
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Ahmadinejad (Dawber 2013). As a result, from 7 October 2014 the European 
sanctions on Iran no longer include the National Iranian Tanker Company, entity 
responsible for the transportation of oil export to the European Union, and its 
assets were no longer frozen (Saul 2014).  
On 4 April 2015 the negotiations between the USA, the UK, Germany, France, 
China, Russia and Iran ended on a successful note with the latter agreeing to 
reduce its enriched uranium volumes by 98% as well as get rid of a significant 
number of centrifuges used in atomic reactors. In response for that, the economic 
sanctions imposed by the EU and the US to be lifted. (Labott, Castillo & Shoichet 
2015.)  
Thus, with the change of leadership from a conservative radical Ahmadinejad to 
reformist moderate Rouhani the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 
regards of its nuclear program now appears completely different in the eyes of the 
international community and both sides are illustrating progress in the dialogue. 
Once again, it seems difficult to analyze whether or not it was the sanctions that 
have had an influence on Iran’s nuclear policy, therefore, the clear conclusion of 
the degree of success cannot be measured as the opinions will differ on that 
matter. 
2.1.3 Sanctions on the USSR 
However, the most notable example under the analysis of this thesis will be the 
economic sanctions and trade embargoes imposed by the United States of 
America on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a response for the Soviet 
Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the boycott of Moscow Olympics of 1980 and 
the consequent worldwide condemnation of such an aggressive expansionist move 
and the resulting international isolation of the USSR (The Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan and the U.S. Response 1978 – 1980). President Carter issued a grain 
embargo on Soviet Union in 1980 using its economic and commercial might in 
order to restrict the actions of the aggressor and its hard line in foreign policy 
towards Afghanistan.  
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The United States being economically stable after the World War 2 enjoyed the 
ability to use the power of food product exports as an instrument for the 
achievement of their political goals at the time when the domestic grain harvest in 
the USSR had decreased by about 21% in that year and such move, therefore, was 
considered to be successful as it was believed to be done in the right time 
(Paarlberg 1980). 
Specific economic sanctions included the ban on the American companies to 
participate in the construction of the 3000 miles long gas pipeline that was 
intended to connect the Siberian gas to the Western European markets in 1981 and 
the restriction on the transfer of the related technologies to the USSR. The 
controversy of this episode were the different diplomatic positions taken by the 
NATO allies namely the USA and Western European member states in which 
countries such as France, Great Britain and Germany were trying to reduce their 
dependency on gas supplies from the OPEC. (Gibney 2014.) 
Nowadays, as well as back then, it is hard to draw the parallels between the US 
led sanctions against the USSR and consequent economic damage made and the 
collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, however, Soviet troops did eventually withdraw 
from Afghanistan. The parallels could be drawn between the then participants and 
current situation as the only country that inherited the Soviet legacy is Russian 
Federation. Soviet Russia was the leading and central state within the USSR and 
after the dissolution it retained the nuclear arsenal of the former superpower as 
well as maintained its role in the eastern hemisphere and remained an important 
player in European affairs. Ethnic Russians comprised more than 50% of the total 
population USSR (USA/USSR: Facts and Figures 1991, 14). This fact assumes 
that the one nation affected by the Cold War era sanctions the most was the 
Russian nation and today the very same people and their descendants are going 
through the similar experiences.  
Lastly, a relatively short period of time has passed from the early 1980s until 
modern days and the number of generations that has changed within the last 35 
years is not very high. Therefore, in the next chapters the parallels will be drawn 
between the USSR and the Russian Federation in the context of the mentality of 
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local residents, their perception of international pressure and their role in the 
formulation of the foreign policy of the country. 
 
2.2 Application to politics 
In general, sanctions are considered as an integral part of international relations 
and are used as an instrument for influencing the decision making processes of 
targeted governments. The primary purpose of such approach lies in its essential 
alternative to the use of military force and very often it has been exercised by an 
influential large nation which is politically active on the international arena. 
Nevertheless, it is believed that sometimes sanctions are used for purposes other 
than interfering into the affairs of other countries, instead, for example, playing an 
important role in the domestic political struggles or for preparing their own 
nations for the upcoming austerity measures. As a rule, sanctions illustrate that the 
sender country will not tolerate or accept certain actions of the targeted country, 
that the verbal statements of condemnation and criticism is indeed supported by 
action and that the sender government will do its best in order to protect the 
national interest of its country.  
However, the sanctions sometimes are not successful and the main reason for that 
is the lack of cooperation between the allies and general inadequacy of the 
sanctions in the particular situation. Another reason for the failure is the possible 
unification of the nation under the sanction and mobilization of target country’s 
resources in support of the position of its government. Sometimes, the political 
component of sanctions does not bring the desired effect because of the 
international opposition in the form of the powerful and wealthy allies of the 
targeted country which compensates the commercial losses to certain level, thus 
limiting the extent of the imposed sanctions. Finally, the sanctions can become 
such a heavy burden on the sender country’s allies and the domestic private sector 
that both parties will express little support if any at all as the interests of the latter 
can be damaged regardless of the damage done to the target country. (Hufbauer, 
Schott, Elliott & Oegg 2007, 3 – 9.) 
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2.3 Results and Achievements 
As the scope of this thesis is limited by the drawn parallels between the USSR and 
Russian Federation, this chapter will present the results and achievements that 
followed the sanctions imposed on Soviet Union in 1980s. First of all, the term 
sanctions will be divided into three parts namely the economic sanctions, trade 
embargoes and diplomatic measures. Then, it will be analyzed if the sanctions 
were successful and regardless of whether they were or were not, the possible 
reasons for that will be evaluated. 
To begin with, the diplomatic measures taken by the United States and its allies 
included the boycott of the Moscow Olympics of 1980. As a result, athletes from 
65 countries did support the boycott whereas 80 countries participated in the 
Olympics. Nevertheless, the Afghan Invasion ended only 9 years later in 1989 
when Soviet troops were pulled out from Afghanistan. (The Olympic Boycott, 
1980 2001 – 2009.) 
Economic sanctions on USSR during the last ten years of its existence were 
imposed in form of a set of various restrictions on the construction of a gas 
pipeline that would transport Siberian gas to the European markets. The US 
Government stopped issuing licenses to American companies that planned the sale 
of the equipment and technology used for the oil and gas transmission and 
refinery purposes to USSR and prohibited its subsidiary and overseas firms from 
selling the equipment and technology that may be used for such purposes. The 
disappointing result was the absolute opposition from the European allies which 
believed that such American actions would affect their trade. Finally, the United 
States Government had backed down on its plans of such measures and the said 
sanctions have eventually failed to stop the construction of the gas pipeline. 
(Soviet Economic Sanctions 1982.)  
Although the Grain Embargo was still in action, on 20 June 1980 President Carter 
made it clear that the subsidiaries of grain companies were allowed to sell the 
grain that was not American in its origin to the USSR. Moreover, Soviet Union 
managed to import the grain from other exporting countries such as Argentina for 
example. Under the agreement proposed by the Soviet exporting company, 
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Argentina would redirect the most part of its customary grain exports to their 
other importing partners and sell almost all of its export oriented corn and grain to 
the USSR for a favorable 25% higher price than the usual. Nevertheless, it is 
believed that Soviet Union had to spend the scarce amounts of its foreign currency 
reserves on that grain bought from other exporters when they were intended for 
purposes other than that, for example for the purchase of Western products and 
technologies. Finally, the shortage of meat products, connected directly to the 
amounts of grain in Soviets reserves, was not perceived so sensitively by the 
population due the fact that there had always been meet deficit on the consumer 
market together with the fact that the residents of USSR consumed roughly twice 
as less than American citizens on average. (The Soviet Grain Embargo 1981.) 
Eventually, this combination of sanctions used by the US Government in 1980s 
although having had its logical damaging effect on Soviet balance of trade, 
livestock economy and international prestige, did not prove to be advantageous as 
an immediate foreign policy tool when taking into account the primary purposes 
of the US which were to stop the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Nowadays, it is 
difficult to assess the role of the Soviet residents and their feelings towards these 
events as well as analyzing their standard of living at that time for the following 
reason. According to Hinckley and Kohut (1993), both practical and cultural 
difficulties in conducting the research concerning public opinion existed in the 
region even after the collapse of the USSR (Hinckley & Kohut 1993, 14 – 18). 
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3 NATIONAL ECONOMY OF RUSSIA 
3.1 Oil as the main source of the GDP 
This sub chapter will concentrate on those parts of the Russian Economy that are 
vital for its existence. In order to analyze the structure and specifics of their 
national economy it is important to evaluate its main sources of GDP.  
According to the World Bank, rents from natural resources, accounted for 18% of 
the country’s GDP, whereas the rents from oil and gas were 13.6% and 2% of 
GDP respectively, in 2013 (World Development Indicators: Contribution of 
natural resources to gross domestic product 2013).  
Moreover, oil and gas alone make up more than half of the federal budget 
revenues and more than 70% of exports for the same year. Being the world’s 3rd 
and 2
nd
 largest producer of oil and gas respectively makes Russian national 
economy heavily dependent on international prices for those commodities as well 
as to the their export potentials and necessary infrastructure. Unsurprisingly, this 
sector of the economy is considered highly strategic and therefore the production 
is restricted by the domestic companies. Companies such as Lukoil, 
Surgutneftegaz and Russneft are privately owned and together represented around 
one third of total oil productions in the year 2012. The transportation needed for 
the oil export is conducted solely by Transneft that controls a little less than 90% 
of the pipeline network within Russian Federation although there has been a 
noticeable shift to the transportation by sea recently. (Russia 2013.) 
In other words, the energy sector within the Russian economy plays a very 
important role and remains the main reason why their economy is placed among 
the developing ones. The oil and gas sectors are not diversified in terms of the 
openness of the sector to free market mechanisms as the government runs it in a 
way similar to nationalized monopoly and therefore any changes both positive and 
negative will have an adverse effect on or will be initiated by the Russian 
Government. The fact that the oil and gas transportation infrastructure is owned 
and operated by a single state owned company illustrates the simplicity of the 
pipeline network in respect to its administration and logistical control, which in 
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turn emphasizes the sole stakeholder in any potential alterations in the sector 
which is once again the Government of Russian Federation. 
There are many other sectors that make their substantial contribution to the 
Russian economy, however, this sub-chapter will concentrate on the energy sector 
as the earnings of the federal budget, for which it contributes significantly, is the 
key tool in the implementation of the country’s domestic policies and plays an 
important role in the decision making process necessary for the future economic 
growth. In other words, as the revenues of the federal budget strongly depend on 
the rents from oil and gas industry, the negative impact on that sector of the 
economy may result in reduced spending on welfare, education and healthcare, 
which, in turn, will lower the standard of living of the ordinary citizens.  
In order to understand the importance of the energy sector in Russian economy the 
following chart is given. It illustrates that, for instance, 33% of Russia’s export 
revenues were generated by the crude oil alone, with gas export responsible for 
14% of that in the year 2013. Another 21% of export revenues were earned by the 
sale of petroleum products with only 32% of export revenues accountable for 
other exports unrelated to the oil and gas sector. (Metelitsa 2014.) 
 
Figure 2 Composition of Russian Export Revenues in 2013 (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration 2013) 
33% 
14% 
21% 
32% 
Crude Oil
Natural Gas
Petroleum Products
Other
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3.2 Fiscal policy 
This subchapter will concentrate on the two arms of Russia’s economic policy, 
namely fiscal and monetary. Both approaches are relatively new in a sense that 
neither of them could be considered traditional to Russian national economy as 
the country’s economic system, although having declared its market orientation in 
1991 with the collapse of the Soviet planned system, as the actual transition to the 
non-planned model took some adaptation time.  
Fiscal Policy, which is responsible for the Government spending and taxation 
across the country, is tightly connected with the Federal Budget of Russia. 
According to the IMF Country Report, Russia’s federal expenditure is linked to 
the revenue calculated with respect to the historical oil price (Russian Federation. 
Fiscal Transparency Evaluation 2014, 30). Therefore, any fluctuations in the 
international oil prices will affect the budget balance. Reduced spending and 
increased taxation may have negative effect on the political rating of the 
Government.  
The logical question that might come in mind here is not if but when will the 
society start wondering: What are the genuine reasons for such stringent measures 
and why is the burden passed on the fundamental basics of the residents’ standard 
of living?  
On the other side of the fiscal policy tool there are taxes and certain developments 
of the last year deserve some attention as well. In March 2014, just days after the 
annexation of Crimea, Russian Ministry of Finance announced that the taxes are 
not to increase in the upcoming four years. At the same time, the budget expenses 
are not to decrease as well within the next three years. (Nikolsky 2015.) 
In the late 2014 Russian Ministry of Finance had announced that the spending will 
decrease by 10%. Out of total amount attributed to Government spending, 33% 
was designated for social obligations, whereas almost the same amount was spent 
on defense and security. In the upcoming year the defense budget is to grow to 
substantial 35% which would account for about 12% of the Russian GDP and it is 
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believed that it might have negative repercussions on other spending areas such as 
healthcare, superannuation or welfare. (Worstal 2014.) 
The drastic difference between the two statements made by the same Ministry 
within one year illustrates the instability that exists within Russia’s main financial 
institutions and leaves a room for a broad discussion in regard to the forecasting 
abilities of Russia’s Ministry of Finance in matters of inflation, economic growth 
and planning of the federal budget.  
In September 2014, Russian Parliament approved the legislation that would 
increase the property tax rate by threefold. (Russian Parliament Approves 
Property Tax Hike 2014.) 
Thus, the Government will pass the newly introduced property tax burden directly 
on to the middle class owners of any kind of real estate as their homes and houses 
are more expensive than those of the poorer residents. 
3.3 Monetary policy 
Monetary policy, a tool very similar to Fiscal policy, is responsible for the 
controls on the amount of the national currency in circulation. Since the 
dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Russia, along with other 14 new independent 
republics, had to shift to a market economy which meant that the monetary policy 
will have to play one of the central roles now. If the amount of money in 
circulation is too low, then the internal investment into the national economy will 
decrease with consequent slowdown of the economic growth, on the other hand, if 
the supply of money increases at a rate higher than the internal production within 
a country, then the prices will rise in order to keep up with the amount of 
disposable income, thus resulting in inflation. Russia’s monetary policy is an 
important factor that must be taken into account when analyzing the country’s 
economy as the Central Bank, although being an independent entity officially, 
does not take on the responsibility of decision making solitarily, but under the 
strict control of Russian Government. According to the PONAR analysis, the 
amendments made to the Law on the Central Bank in July 2002 increased the 
Governmental control over it as now only one representative of the Central Bank 
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of Russia will be one of the twelve members of the National Banking Council, an 
institution that approves the monetary and credit policy, whereas the Government, 
presidential administration and legislature will have three, three and five members 
respectively (Johnson 2004).  
In 1993 it was the loose nature of the monetary policy which allowed the level of 
inflation to reach 874% with together with shrinking economy and decreased 
investment. In order to combat such negative effects of transition to a market 
economy the Russian Central Bank created a corridor for the ruble’s fluctuations. 
Although the inflation reduced to 14% by the year 1997, the Central Bank 
defended the value of their currency despite the dramatic fall in a number of Asian 
currencies and had therefore lost almost 6 billion USD. As a result, just a year 
later, the ruble depreciated by about 60% with the inflation levels rising to 85.7% 
in 1999. (Wiel 2013.) 
These two cases are presented in order to give the general view on the extreme 
levels of inflation in the Russian history. These cases illustrate the vulnerability of 
Russia’s national currency to the external influences one of which is the 
international oil price.  
TABLE 1. Inflation of Russian Ruble for 1993 and 1998 and International Oil 
Prices (Inflation in Russia 2015 &  Inflation Data 2015) 
Year Rate of Inflation Average Oil Price 
Previous Year 
Oil Price 
1993 840% USD 16.75 USD 19.25 
1998 84.5% USD 11.91 USD 18.64 
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Table 1 illustrates the levels on inflation of Russian Ruble for the year 1993 and 
compares it with Ruble default of 1998 and contrasts both with the international 
oil prices at that time as well as giving the oil price change with respect to the 
previous year. Therefore, the relationship between the international oil prices and 
the steep devaluation of Ruble exists and Russian national currency is sensitive to 
the changes in the price of oil.  
The current state of affairs in regard to Russia’s monetary policy will be reviewed 
in more detail in the subchapter 4.2 after the necessary empirical analysis is 
conducted. 
3.4 Reserve Fund 
In this subchapter the role of the Stabilization Fund is explained with respect to its 
insuring nature and the possible scenarios on its fate are analyzed at the midst of 
recent developments. 
The Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation was created for the purpose of 
accumulating the country’s revenues, generated by oil exports during the sharp 
increase in the international prices of crude oil, and preserving them for future 
references such as oil price drop below the set 27 USD per barrel. In other words, 
Russian Ministry of Finance, led by liberal Alexei Kudrin made a decision to take 
the advantage of the favorable market conditions of that time and create a safety 
net for the self-sufficiency of Russia’s Federal Budget in case of financial crises. 
As a result of such pre-emptive actions, Russia, as it is believed by experts, was 
able to pass through the 2008 recession in a better condition. This financial 
institution was separated into its two successors, namely Reserve Fund and the 
Fund of National Welfare in 2008. (Kononova 2010.) 
Other than that, the Stabilization Fund had one more very important role. It served 
as an instrument of Russia’s monetary policy as by performing its basic functions 
it was at the same time diverting the rising oil revenues from the general 
circulation, thus, reducing the risk of inflation associated with supernatural profits 
during the periods of sharp increases in the oil prices.  
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However, even though the Stabilization Fund is believed to be advantageous, 
there might be a certain level of criticism related to the level of its practical 
viability due to the fact of the money accumulated there being “dead” by nature, 
or in other words unusable in the short term. The oil revenues of the Stabilization 
Fund do not generate any kind of extra profit, nor they are immune to the annual 
inflation rate and therefore keep depreciating when they could be spent for some 
other potentially beneficial purposes that could improve the standards of living or 
the infrastructure of the country. 
In February 2015, the very same Ministry of Finance that had once created the 
Fund proposed the withdrawal of around USD 52 billion from the Reserve Fund 
in order to cover the insufficiency of Federal Budget that occurred due to falling 
oil prices and international isolation of Russia’s financial system. This amount is 
believed to be more than half of fund’s total value and the authorities claim that 
without such measures the budget deficit could reach 4.7% of GDP. (Ostroukh 
2015.) 
The fears of Russia’s Finance Ministry were not imaginary in any possible way as 
according to the ministry’s data the value of the Reserve Fund depleted by USD 5 
billion by the beginning of April 2015. According to the forecast from the World 
Bank Russia’s Reserve Fund is to experience further depletion this year due to the 
projected economic recession. (Milyavskaya 2015.) 
The depletion of Russia’s Reserve Fund may have a wide range of negative 
consequences in regard to its international obligations and various organizations 
of which it remains an active participant. First of all, Russia’s commitment to the 
BRICS will be put on trial with respect to its financial obligations related to their 
membership in there as the organization itself, being considered a relatively new 
formation, will need a certain amount of investment for the necessary economic 
boost as well as for the establishment of its independent financial institutions and 
funds of any kind. On the other hand, there is Russia’s membership and leading 
financial and economic position in the new Eurasian Economic Union which will 
be discussed in more detail in the subchapter 5.2. 
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TABLE 2. Sovereign Funds of the CIS countries (Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Institute 2015) 
Country Funds Assets in 
billions 
Year of 
Inception 
Origin of 
Funds 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund USD 37.3  1999 Oil 
Kazakstan Samruk-Kazyna 
JCS    
Kazakstan 
National Fund 
National 
Investment 
Corporation 
USD 77.5 
                    
USD 77           
 
USD 2                   
2008 
                    
2000 
 
2012 
Oil 
 
Oil 
 
Oil 
Russia Reserve Fund 
National 
Welfare Fund       
USD 88.9                 
USD 79.9 
                            
2008            
2008 
                      
Oil 
Oil 
 
Table 2 illustrates the sovereign wealth funds of the Azerbaijan, Kazakstan and 
Russia as well as their values and the years of creation together with the origin of 
funds. There are a number of common features possessed by the chosen countries. 
First of all, all these countries are from the former USSR. Secondly, each of the 
listed funds is supported by the oil revenues. The table contrasts the values of the 
funds in order to highlight the position of Russian financial potential to other 
members of the CIS.  
3.5 Pipeline infrastructure 
Although the pipeline network is not an economic term in its nature, it does, 
however, play a fundamental role in the transporting potential of a wide range of 
products that originate from Russia’s energy sector and therefore remains one of 
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the basic engines of its national economy. To begin with, it is important to 
mention the current condition of the existing network. 
First of all, most of the existing network of Russia’s oil and gas pipelines was 
constructed in Soviet Union between 1960 and 1970 for purposes of 
transportation of crude oil and natural gas to the refineries for further foreign 
export (Chernyaev 1996).  
Unfortunately, the network has not seen a complete modernization ever since, 
although the normal lifespan of a pipe last 35 year at the most and in 2013 the 
independent analyst Anna Annenkova stated that the wearing out of the pipelines 
had reached almost 70%, of which 20% were in an absolutely critical state. As a 
result of that, about 5% to 7% of transported oil is being lost due to accidents and 
consequent leakage. Although Transneft, Russia’s sole owner of the network 
conducts the modernization works at different parts of the pipeline, the degree of 
done work is not enough. For instance, the modernization and replacement work 
that were conducted on Druzhba pipeline between years 2010 and 2013 resulted in 
only 10% of total length to be renewed. (Annenkova 2013.) 
One more thought which comes into mind in regard to pipeline condition is the 
undeniable fact that any kind of related modernization or replacement requires the 
investment and given the current state of the federal budget it seems that the task 
becomes only more difficult as the time goes by while pipeline network does only 
get older.  
Russia, taking into account its vast territories and the distance from oil and gas 
basins located mainly in Siberia to the two main markets in Europe and China, 
possesses an extensive length of oil and gas networks. However, this thesis will 
focus only on those networks that are considered important within the context of 
sanctions and the possibility of new markets available for the sale of Russia’s 
energy resources. 
First of all, one the most vital pipelines that carry Russian gas is the Nord Stream 
that lies under the Baltic Sea and connects the supply with German, Dutch, British 
and French markets without any transit countries. This, in turn, reduces the risks 
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associated with third party involvement in the gas transporting system and 
therefore ensures the energy security of Europe on the technical side. Completed 
in 2011 this pipeline’s potential is considered to be around 55 billion cubic meters 
per year. (Nord Stream.) 
 
FIGURE 3. The Nord Steam Pipeline (Modified from Gazprom) 
Altai Project, although not being fully completed, plays vital role in Russia’s gas 
transportation network as its main part already exists and only a small part is to be 
completed soon. The project is intended to connect the already existing pipeline of 
Russia’s Altai region with China’s Xinjian Autonomous region with first supplies 
planned for the late 2015. (Altai.) 
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FIGURE 4. The Altai Project (Modified from Gazprom) 
However, two the most significant pipeline projects are the Power of Siberia and 
Turkish Stream, the latter will be reviewed in more detail in subchapter 5.5. 
The Power of Siberia pipeline project is planned to connect Russia’s eastern gas 
fields located in Yakutia and Irkutsk Region to the unified gas transmission 
system for the future support of Russia’s gas exports to China via the eastern 
route. The planned capacity of the project is suggested to be at 38 billion cubic 
meters of gas. (Power of Siberia.) 
 
FIGURE 5. The Power of Siberia Pipeline Project (Modified from Gazprom) 
All of the mentioned pipeline corridors, regardless of their length and complexity 
of construction, are connecting the supplier with the buyer directly and that 
condition is advantageous for a number of reasons. Firstly, the political risks 
associated with the transit of gas have become clearly visible with the beginning 
and the escalation of Russia Ukraine conflict. On the other hand, the transit of gas 
via the third countries will always increase the costs taken into account that 
different countries have their own tariffs and taxes combined with a range of 
regulations and possible political instability. 
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3.6 Role of the State and the Business and their relationship 
The relationship between business and state is one of the ways to review the 
Russian economy. Although there have not been too many publications on the 
nature of such relationship, it is clear that the process of their mutual engagement 
has its own effect on the society at some level. From the European and American 
perspective, it is difficult to understand the basic trends within this relationship for 
the following reason. The model of analysis and the way to look at the 
relationship between the state and the business is completely different in the 
western world in contrast with Russia and therefore its use with lack objectivity to 
some extent. (Fokin 2009, 116 – 121.) 
Furthermore, the relationship between those two institutions in the western 
countries has been generated for the some centuries now, whereas the business 
was introduced in Russia relatively recently, with the adoption of market oriented 
economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. For that reason, these two 
fundamental differences make this field of study to be one of interest. In order to 
analyze the structure of the described relationship from inside it is vital to mention 
the emergence of Russia’s private sector from the very beginning.  
After the appropriate regulation was introduced in 1992, a number of oil 
companies, that were state owned before, were privatized by new entrepreneurs 
with the creation of vertically-integrated companies that combined the extraction 
and refinery of crude oil. The distinctive feature of this privatization process was 
in the fact that the Russian Government, although initiated the process, had 
retained the monopoly for the transportation and export of crude oil as well as the 
transportation within the country itself. With the expansionist nature of newly 
formed oil corporations their share of the oil sector had risen dramatically as a 
result of mergers and acquisitions, and by 2002 Yukos, LUKoil and 
Surgutneftegaz were together responsible for more than half of Russia’s 
production and exports of oil. In regards to the relationship of such oil companies 
with the State it is important to mention for the reference that if, for example, 
LUKoil was state-influenced entity, then the Yukos was a corporation free from 
State influence. (Berkowitz & Semikolenova 2006, 1 – 7.) 
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During the first years after the dissolution of the USSR a number of influential 
businessmen, often referred to as oligarchs have emerged on Russia’s political 
scene. For a more thorough understanding of the situation of that period Russia’s 
business elite that was in the opposition will be studied and the events that 
followed the contest between the state and the business will be described in this 
subchapter. 
First of all, it is Boris Berezovsky who had enjoyed the fruit of the privatization 
process and by mid 1990s becomes a millionaire with shares at a number of 
Russia’s key corporations in the industries such as media, airlines and the energy 
and plays a central role in the 1996 presidential campaign. Although being 
considered as one of Vladimir Putin’s supporters at first, by the year 2000 his 
relationship with the newly elected president deteriorates and later that year he 
immigrates to the UK and becomes the main opposition to the state represented by 
the new president with the latter demanding his extradition on fraud and money 
laundering charges a year after. Having lived all the subsequent years in the exile, 
Boris Berezovsky dies in 2013 under unknown circumstances. (Jones 2013.) 
The assets of Boris Berezovsky at height of his power before exile to the United 
Kingdom were diverse in their origin. Stakes at Sibneft, one of the Russia’s very 
first oil companies; national airline Aeroflot, Rusal aluminum giant and the most 
watched ORT TV channel were the integral parts of his business empire. Other 
not less important properties included Kommersant publishing company and 
LogoVAZ which was at a time one of the earliest car dealership companies in the 
early 1990s. (Kramer 2006.) 
Apart from Berezovsky, Russia’s once richest man Mikhail Khodorkovsky is also 
considered one of the most prominent members of Russia’s business elite that has 
also made his fortune during the early years of privatization. After the purchase of 
state owned Yukos in 1995 transforming it into one of the most well established 
companies in a country that adopted the principles of transparency in its 
operations. After his arrest in 2003 he was jailed two years later with charges such 
as fraud, embezzlement and fraud. His legal defense claimed that all the 
allegations were fabricated and criminal proceedings were initiated on political 
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grounds. Taking into account the fact of his financial support to political parties 
that were in the opposition to Vladimir Putin’s Government, his position towards 
the state has never been of a secret. During his prison sentence Yukos was 
declared bankrupt. (Profile: Mikhail Khodorkovsky 2013.) 
TABLE 4. Oil production by Yukos (RPI & Carbon Majors) 
Years Yukos Oil 
Production in 
million tons 
Total Oil 
Production in 
Russia in million 
tons 
Share of Total Oil 
Production 
1995 47 298 15.77% 
1996 46 292 15.75% 
1997 47 295 16.27% 
1998 45 292 15.41% 
1999 44 305 14.43% 
2000 49 323 15.17% 
2001 58 348 16.67% 
2002 69 380 18.16% 
2003 81 395 20.50% 
 
Table 4 highlights the oil production volumes of Yukos Company in contrast with 
the total oil production within the Russian Federation starting from the year 1995 
when it was acquired by Mikhail Khodorkovsky up until 2003 when legal action 
against him was started. As shown on the table, the petroleum production volumes 
have been increasing steadily over the given period of time with the exception 
during the years 1998 and 1999 with possible explanation being the Ruble default 
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at that time which might have had its own adverse effect on Russia’s private 
sector. Although the table 4 gives us the data on the Yukos’s oil production 
volumes for a relatively distant period of time, it reflects the trend of the 
increasing share of total oil production that played an important role in the 
political influence of its owner, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. 
Both the State and Business play an important role in Russian national economy. 
Moreover, their relationship has not always been uniform and was constantly 
changing during all these years since the collapse of Soviet Union. The state on 
the one hand and business on the other represent the two antagonist powers that 
comprise Russia.  
This struggle between the business and the state has ended with their relationship 
being transformed into a new form. Now, business and state represent one single 
entity in Russian Federation. Moreover, their operations and agenda together with 
the long term strategy and the objectives are similar as they work towards a 
common goal. The very fact that supports such point of view is in the sanctions 
list, where government officials stand side by side with business entities and their 
owners. The role of business has not diminished since, as nowadays, it serves as 
financial safety net for state’s foreign policy and should therefore be always 
considered one the most vital parts of Russian Economy. 
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4 ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
4.1 Economic performance before and after sanctions 
In order to understand whether or not the imposed economic sanctions affected 
Russian economy it is necessary to analyze their economy from a number of key 
macroeconomic concepts. For a better understanding, the economic performance 
factors for the period available before the sanctions were imposed will be 
compared with the same performance factors for the period a year later. Then, the 
data will be further compared with the latest available period for a deeper 
understanding of the situation. 
First of all, one of the best performance factors used to measure the level of the 
economic activity is the Gross Domestic Product. As the very first economic 
sanctions imposed by the US in 2014 were on 17 March with the very last ones 
being imposed on 11 September it will not be an accurate reflection of the 
situation if the GDP value for the year 2014 is taken into account. Sanctions are a 
complex instrument and therefore need a certain amount of time to have an effect 
and the national economy of the country is a sophisticated system of variables that 
also needs time in order for alterations to happen. For that reason, due to the 
unavailability of data for 2015 GDP, such economic variable will not be analyzed. 
However, such parameter as quarterly GDP growth rate is already available and 
therefore will be studied instead. According to the Federal State Statistics Service, 
Russia’s GDP growth rate for the first quarter of 2014 was at 0.6%, for the second 
quarter at 0.7%, at 0.9% for the third and at only 0.4% for the last, in contrast with 
the corresponding values for the previous year that were 0.8%, 1%, 1.3% and 2% 
respectively. Such difference, although not very significant, points out that the 
GDP growth is slowing down, which in turn can be one of the signs of the 
economic recession if such trends were to continue in 2015. (Russia GDP Annual 
Growth Rate 2015.) 
Value of imports and exports plays a very important role in the economic 
performance and gives a whole picture of country’s foreign trade. According to 
the Central Bank of Russia, the country’s exports began a steady decline over the 
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year 2014 with the export values for the beginning of the second quarter 2014 
being USD 47.662 billion, for the third quarter USD 46.207 billion and USD 
41.137 billion for the last quarter with a dramatic fall to USD 27.510 billion in the 
first quarter of 2015 (Russia Exports 2015). As for the imports, the values for 
corresponding quarters were USD 27.681 billion, USD 29.184 billion and USD 
26.915 billion with only USD 12.463 billion for the first quarter of 2015 (Russia 
Imports 2015).  
The decline in Russia’s balance of trade is a clear indicator of the decreasing 
volumes of foreign trade turnover which corresponds clearly to the demand that is 
made up by the country’s middle class. Such changes in the demand generated by 
the middle class are very important for the position of the domestic trade that 
responds to the final value of country’s GDP.  
TABLE 5. Russia Consumer Price Index (Trading Economics 2015) 
Period CPI Index 
July 2014 427.5 
August 2014 429.6 
September 2014 431.4 
October 2014 434.9 
November 2014 440.5 
December 2014 452 
January 2015 469.6 
February 2015 479.9 
March 2015 485.6 
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Consumer Price Index is also one of the ways to measure the level of economic 
activity and presents a special interest in this thesis. Based on data from the 
Federal State Statistics Service, Russian CPI had undergone some significant 
alterations since the mid-2014. As illustrated on the table the CPI at a value 
slightly less than 430 points in the beginning of the third quarter of 2014 and 
around 435 points in the corresponding period of the last quarter of 2014, in the 
beginning of the first quarter of 2015 it had experienced a sharp increase to about 
470 points with the value in the end of the first quarter 2015 rising to a little less 
than 490 points. (Russia Consumer Price Index 2015.) 
Such sharp increases in consumer prices might be the result of the food ban 
imposed by Russia in August 2014 as a response to the international sanctions. 
The price increases of for the imported products present a very sensitive issue to 
the Russian economy due to the fact that their economy is in its developing stage. 
 
4.2 The influence of sanctions on currency fluctuations 
Currency stability together with the foreign exchange rate against the world’s 
most used currencies as well as against the currencies of Russia’s main trade 
partners is indeed one of the most fundamental factors responsible for the 
economic development. The fluctuations of national currency will be analyzed 
with respect to the exchange rate, negative slide of the international oil prices and 
the interventions from the country’s main financial institution, namely Central 
Bank of Russian Federation. Moreover, the resulted price hike of the wide range 
of the imported goods will be under review with respect to the purchasing power 
of consumers. 
Beginning in July 2014 Russian national currency – ruble began its steady 
decline. According to the XE, the exchange rate between US Dollar and Russian 
Ruble on 16 October 2014 was at 40.86 Rubles for 1 Dollar, on 16 November the 
rate was at 47.2 Rubles for 1 Dollar and a month later the exchange rate reached 
68.46 Rubles for 1 Dollar with the record value reached on 1 February 2015 being 
at 69.66 Rubles for 1 Dollar. (XE Currency Charts 2015.) 
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The international price of oil began its decline in the beginning of July 2014 
starting at around USD 115 per barrel and falling to USD 80 per barrel in the early 
November 2014 and reaching USD 60 per barrel by the mid December 2014 (1 
Year Crude Oil Prices and Charts 2015). 
As oil plays a significant role in Russia’s revenues, the decrease in the 
international oil prices force the Ruble to fall. In other words, when the oil price 
falls, the revenues of Russia’s Federal Budget decrease and in order to cover the 
losses the Central Bank has no other option but to devaluate the Ruble and 
therefore, the Ruble’s foreign exchange rate will always be proportional to the 
fluctuations in the oil prices. 
In order to support the national currency, Russia’s Central Bank had used its 
foreign currency reserves and intervened by purchasing USD 15.7 billion worth of 
Rubles (Tanas, Kuznetsov 2014). 
In simple words, by selling foreign currency in exchange for rubles the Central 
Bank increased the amount of foreign currency in circulation, thus aiming to 
reduce its price as the increase in supply is believed to generate decrease in 
demand. At the same time it was believed to work vice versa for the Ruble as the 
reduced supply of it was believed to spark up the demand, resulting in rise in its 
value. 
The fall of Ruble’s value had a very negative effect on businesses, particularly 
those which operate in the industry of the resale and imports. In November 2014, 
Apple increased the prices for its production by 25% in order to combat the 
declining exchange rate of Ruble and one month later the price of new iPhone 6 
was 35% higher than before in Russian store (Cook 2014). As people concerned 
with the devaluing Ruble tried to purchase vehicles in order to invest money in 
luxurious products which could be considered as assets, the world’s famous 
carmakers such as Audi, General Motors and Jaguar Land Rover have all 
temporarily stopped sales in response to the fluctuations of Russian currency with 
Toyota announcing the upcoming price increases and BMW reacting relatively 
earlier than the others by redirecting their sales to more stable markets already 
earlier in 2014 (Kresge, Shatalova 2014). Other clothing companies such as 
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Calvin Klein, Armani Jeans and Michael Kors suspended their exports to Russia 
and electronics producers Lenovo, Acer and Samsung have followed Apple’s path 
by increasing their retail prices (Foreign Companies Decrease Exports to Russia, 
Raise Prices 2014).  
To conclude, the decrease in the Ruble’s value against the US Dollar can be 
viewed from different perspectives. First of all, for the ordinary consumers the 
devalued Ruble is a negative sign as prices for the imported goods increase in 
proportion to the exchange rate in addition to the reduced purchasing power when 
travelling abroad. However, for the exporters, on the other hand, it is a positive 
sign as their exports become cheap for the foreign importers which in turn tend to 
have positive effects on the balance of trade and the increases in export revenues. 
Moreover, Russia’s export oriented businesses; producers of fuel-energy products 
in particular, receive their income in Dollars or Euros, but pay salaries and taxes 
in Rubles (Khlebnikov 2014). According to Balakirev, chief analysis at UFS, the 
substantial weakening of the Ruble might provoke discontent among the Russia’s 
population (Lossan 2014).  
4.3 Performance of the energy sector in relation to sanctions 
The primary purpose of the economic sanctions on Russia was to reduce its 
economic activity and the appearance of both private and state oil and gas 
companies on the sanctions list means that this very sector of the economy is on 
the agenda. This subchapter will analyze the performance of the energy sector in 
the Russian economy after the imposition of sanctions and compare it with the 
data for previous periods in terms of the overall output of petroleum production, 
net incomes earned by both state and private companies and the fate of large scale 
exploration, drilling and extraction projects from the general point of view.  
One of the key indicators that demonstrate certain changes in this industry is the 
output or in other words the oil production. Despite the sanctions and falling oil 
prices, Russia produced an all-time record amount of crude oil and gas condensate 
since the 1991 according to the data from the Central Dispatching Department of 
Fuel Energy Complex. The average output reached 10.58 million barrels oil per 
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day with exports to China increased by almost 43%. According to the Energy 
Ministry, the total output of oil production increased by 0.7% in 2014. (IB Times) 
Nevertheless, the production increase does not necessarily result in the increase of 
net profits. According to the data from the company’s annual report, the net 
income attributable to LUKoil fell from USD 7.846 billion in 2013 to USD 4.764 
billion in 2014 (Financial reports 2014).  
According to the state oil company Rosneft, their profit fell by 10% in contrast 
with the last year and net income of the company in 2014 was USD 5.7 billion 
(Golubkova 2015). 
The falling profits of LUKoil and Rosneft will also result in the lesser amount of 
funds available for the drilling and exploration expenses which in turn will have 
consequent negative effect on the production levels which are expected to decline 
over the time due to the depletion of oil wells.  
The sanctions that prohibited the cooperation and exchange of technologies with 
the Russian oil companies exploring the Arctic fields have had a considerable 
effect on the energy sector. As a result, a number of strategically important oil and 
gas exploration projects agreed between Russia’s state oil companies and 
international corporations such as Exxon, Royal Dutch Shell, Eni and Statoil will 
need to be halted for the period while sanctions are active. The problem for 
Russian energy sector is the decline in the oil production at the Western Siberia 
region as Russia wants to keep current output and new exploration projects were 
being developed for those very purposes. Moreover, the sanctions left Russian 
private and state companies without external financing and now the sole 
exploration and oil extraction activities inside and overseas are also put at risk. 
(Gotev 2014.) 
Keeping the oil production output at current level seem illogical for Russia 
because as one of the leading producers of crude oil in the world and therefore 
having a considerable weight in the international energy market it could use its 
own decrease in the oil production in order to increase the demand and therefore 
price for that commodity.  
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Based on data from the US Energy Information Agency, the annual oil production 
has increased from 7.464 million barrels per day in 2013 to 8.68 million barrels 
per day in 2014 (U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil 2015). In December 2014, 
OPEC made it clear that the cartel will not reduce the oil production regardless to 
the falling oil prices, thus, defending its market share (Raval 2014). Therefore, it 
is clear that the price of oil will not rise if its productions output is decreased by 
Russia alone. Russia’s Federal Budget is supported by the rents from the oil and 
gas exports from the state controlled companies and from taxes paid by the 
privately owned companies, therefore, the falling oil prices in combination with 
the decrease in profitability of both types of companies might result in the budget 
deficit for the 2015. Russia was well prepared to a global financial crisis of 2008 
because its reserve funds were once created for this very reason (Sutela 2010). 
Now, the country on the one hand is unable to compensate the expenses of the 
reserve fund due to the falling oil prices; while on the other hand, it has no access 
to the foreign capital due to sanctions imposed. Therefore, Russia’s abilities to 
respond to the economic recession are limited. 
There are several factors that determine that price of oil. First of all, it is the 
slowdown of China’s economic growth that has to be taken into account as it is 
the second largest oil consumer worldwide. The increased output of oil production 
by the US is also one important factor that affects it. Another factor is the natural 
concept of the elasticity of demand as low prices for a commodity may increase 
the demand for it that could result in the price increase. The fourth factor is the 
policy of OPEC that regulates the output levels of the oil production. The last but 
not the least, in the short-term, the geopolitical situation affects the oil price to a 
great extent as any military actions increase fears of the oil supply disruption that 
force oil prices to rise. (Cunnigham 2015.) 
4.4 Capital movement 
The movement of capital is a concept that is highly important for a developing 
economy. This subchapter will review this aspect in regards to the three following 
variables: the volumes Foreign Direct Investment, the capital outflow and the 
presence of international companies in Russian Federation. 
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4.4.1 FDI and capital outflow 
According to the Central Bank of Russia, the total outflow of the capital for the 
year 2014 was USD 151 billion in contrast with only USD 61 billion in the 
previous year. As believed by the Central Bank, the reason for such record 
outflow of the capital was the instability in the exchange rate of the national 
currency that motivated the purchase of foreign currencies in exchange for Ruble. 
Second reason was a direct effect of the imposed economic sanctions that 
restricted the possibility of the refinancing of the debt of Russia’s private sector 
which was left with no other choice but to repay its foreign debt. The economic 
forecast given by the Central Bank and a number of analysts suggests the capital 
outflow of the year 2015 to be higher than USD 100 billion. In addition to the 
capital outflow, the Foreign Direct Investment into Russia had stopped in the 
beginning of 2014 with the amount of foreign capital outflow for the first three 
quarters of 2014 totaling USD 21.7 billion. The end result of ceased FDI is 
believed to have negative consequences on the oil and gas, metallurgy, trade, 
agriculture and real estate sectors. (Kuchma 2015.) 
4.4.2 Exit of foreign companies 
For a number of different reasons some worldwide famous companies have exited 
Russian market while others have expressed concern over the worsening 
economic situation that resulted from sanctions. Other foreign companies became 
the target for retaliatory sanctions imposed by Russia as a response. 
In August 2014, a number of McDonald’s locations were closed down in Moscow 
for sanitary violations as it has been claimed by Russia’s Federal Consumer 
Agency. Beverages producers such as Carlsberg, Coca Cola and Danone have all 
reported the decline in their sales volumes with the latter having to raise prices in 
order to combat falling profits sparked by the inflation. The car making industry 
has suffered considerable losses with Renault expressing worries of forecasted 
low sales volumes and Volkswagen experiencing 8% decline in its sales for the 
first two quarters of 2014, while Ford was also affected by the falling sales also 
resulted from the inflation of Ruble. (Petroff 2014.) 
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In the oil industry the events followed a similar path. As announced in early 
October 2014, Exxon Mobil followed the US sanctions and withdrew from 9 large 
scale industrial projects that were planned to take place in Russia’s Arctic, 
Western Siberian and Black Sea oil fields with Shell acting in a similar manner by 
halting all of its operations within Russia. The importance of the cooperation from 
foreign oil companies lies in the fact that almost 25% of Russia’s recoverable oil 
is being extracted by the hydraulic fracturing method whereas the specific 
equipment used for such operations is produced mainly by the US. Therefore, if 
Russian oil producers do fail to find the substitutes of such equipment the output 
of oil production will fall. (Lossan 2014.) 
One of the potential risks associated with the possible exit of foreign companies 
from the Russia’s market as well as temporary or permanent suspension of their 
operations there is the subsequent unemployment that will result as the factories 
shut and projects are frozen. Another problem could be the outflow of the skilled 
workforce in a form of experienced specialist, professionals and scientist that 
might seek better working conditions elsewhere leaving Russia.  
4.5 Conclusions 
First of all, as the data presented in subchapter 4.1 illustrates, the Russian national 
economy is more likely to be heading towards an economic recession which is 
clearly indicated by the slowdown of the GDP growth rate for each quarter of 
2014. Declining volumes of imports and exports are also not a positive sign 
especially when combined with the increasing consumer prices fueled by inflation 
of national currency. Destabilization of Russian Ruble with its devaluated value 
together with depleting foreign currency reserves both represents a substantial 
threat for the country’s economic development. The performance of the energy 
sector despite the record high output levels is also unsatisfactory due to the crash 
in the oil prices and the forecasted budget deficit will sooner or later have the 
effect on the standard of living. Outflow of the foreign and domestic capital from 
Russia, the zero levels of Foreign Direct Investment together with possible exit of 
a number of foreign companies and their subsidiaries have all done a considerable 
damage to the country’s economic position.  
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Therefore, for these very reasons, it will be correct to assume that the imposed 
economic sanctions indeed were effective from the technical point of view, as 
they have achieved their primary purpose of damaging the Russian economy. 
However, as the Crimea still remains a federal district of Russian Federation and 
the military actions in Eastern Ukraine still go on, the sanctions are not practically 
effective. Therefore, the second part of this subchapter will analyze the reasons 
for it. 
Earlier in January, Standard and Poor has also downgraded Russia’s rating from 
Bbb- to Bb+ with the negative outlook, thus placing it under the investment-grade 
territory. According to S&P, Russian economy will experience a slow growth of 
around 0.5% per year in the next three years with the inflation levels rising above 
10% in 2015. (Albanese, Armental 2015.) 
In February 2015, Moody’s downgraded the sovereign debt rating of the Russian 
Federation from Baa3 to Ba1 and now the outlook of the rating is considered as 
negative. According to the Moody’s Investors Service, there are three major 
reasons for such measures to be taken. First of all, they believe that the ongoing 
conflict in Ukraine together with the instability in the oil price and the currency 
exchange rates will continue to affect the Russian economy in a negative way. 
Secondly, due to the capital outflows and the depletion of Russia’s foreign 
exchange reserves coupled with fiscal pressures the financial potential of the 
Government will deteriorate. Lastly, Moody’s believes that the international 
pressure put on Russia in response to the conflict in Ukraine might result in the 
untimely payments of their external debt. (Moody’s downgrades Russia’s 
sovereign rating to Ba1 from Baa3; outlook negative 2015.) 
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5 ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
After the evaluation of the practical failure of economic sanctions imposed on 
Russia, the major part of this subchapter concentrates on various alternative 
solutions that are proposed instead of the economic sanctions which are imposed 
at the moment with each option analyzed in terms of its practical effectiveness 
with advantages for each method clearly illustrated. 
5.1 Reasons for failure and parallels with the USSR 
This sub-chapter analyzes the possible factors that have influenced the 
ineffectiveness of the economic sanctions from the practical point of view in 
regard to some fundamental principles of geopolitics and history. Parallels are 
drawn between the modern day Russian Federation and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics in terms of similarities, differences and the inherent features 
of the successor state. It also explains the negative consequences that resulted 
from the sanctions from the European perspective. 
5.1.1 Practical failure 
The main reason for the practical ineffectiveness of economic sanctions against 
Russia lies in their origin. As it is clearly visible from the timeline of events, these 
sanctions have been crafted and initiated by the United States of America, 
whereas European member states have only followed similar path on the basis of 
NATO alliance. Certainly, the aggressive and expansionist actions of the Russian 
Federation do not go in accordance with the European principles of democracy, 
tolerance and liberalism, however, in order for sanctions to be more effective EU 
should have created their own sanctions independently from their American allies.  
One of the reasons for this particular point of view is the historical relationship 
between Europe and Russia and the geopolitical location of both. Located on two 
opposite sides of Eurasian continent, these two parts of the world, although being 
illustrated by some as antagonist, have shared centuries of cooperation, friendship 
and common history. Before the Socialist Revolution of 1917 and subsequent 
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creation of the USSR, modern day Russia was a 19 century European Empire and 
was fully integrated into almost all European affairs. The proof for that could be 
the alliances created between Russia, France and Britain with such trends existing 
even after the Socialist Revolution. Soviet Union, among other allies including 
Great Britain, the United States, France and Australia, had also resisted the spread 
of fascism in Europe and played an equally important role in allied victory in the 
World War 2. In the period prior to that war, Soviet Russia was the closest partner 
of Nazi Germany. Therefore, in order to make sanctions workable, all these 
factors needed to be taken into account.  
Moreover, the imposed sanctions not only damage the Russian economy, but hurt 
European businesses as well. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, along 
with other 14 new independent republics, has adopted the market oriented 
economic model which attracted a number of western and Asian companies into 
the country, the level of cooperation had only increased over the years with 
significant amounts of funds been invested in, therefore, scaling back the 
production will obviously mean financial losses for the private sector of the EU. 
The Russian mentality was not taken into account as well during the preparatory 
stage of the sanction. In other words, the USA together with EU have imposed 
sanctions that are effective from their point of view or could work in their own 
countries, but have little effect if any on Russia. 
5.1.2 Parallels with the USSR 
In order to understand the importance of the public opinion the parallels are drawn 
between Russia and USSR. First of all, the main differences between the former 
and the latter were the economic system and ideology. According to the Library of 
Congress, foreign trade comprised a very small percentage of Soviet foreign trade 
in terms of contribution to its GNP (Soviet Union 1989). That means that the 
Soviet economy was not sensitive to the imports and the sanctions of 1980s have 
had a limited effect therefore, whereas Russia, with the adoption of market 
oriented economic model and recent membership of the WTO, had opened its 
market to foreign trade. For instance, for the EU Russia is third largest trade 
partner according to the European Commission (Countries and Regions. Russia 
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2015). That means Russians are more sensitive towards the sanctions than the 
residents of the USSR before as the former have enjoyed more than two decades 
of increasing foreign trade. In other words, if the sanctions remain in place for 
longer period of time and foreign companies follow the recent trend of exiting 
Russian market, the ordinary consumers will sooner or later feel the deficit of 
imported cars, clothes and other luxurious goods.  
Another important difference between the two is the current level of the 
integration between independent countries and increasing role of globalization. 
For example, when Russian Empire was transformed into the USSR, the level of 
mutual cultural exchange between the West and the East was limited by the means 
of communications, in contrast, nowadays, with the creation of internet and 
advances in media technologies the societies in different countries become more 
interconnected with each other, share more common features and tend to become 
even closer and more homogeneous. For that reason alone, the international 
isolation of the Russian Federation will leave a considerable impact on its society 
in cultural aspect that could have negative effect on the process of its 
democratization.  
Lastly, the all-pervasive ideology of the Communist Party played a vital role in 
the formation of the public opinion in the USSR whereas today, the ruling United 
Russia Party does not have a clear official ideology. Nevertheless, as the most 
people of legal age that lived in the USSR in 1980s still live today in modern 
Russia, it is correct to presume that the mentality of people does not change 
immediately with the fall of one regime and appearance of a new regime lead by 
the very same individuals. In simple words, the Government uses similar 
principles of mass control that are based on the confrontation to the USA and 
Europe and the results of public opinion surveys only confirm such assumption. 
Levada Centre that conducts research of public opinion in Russian Federation 
presented some interesting results in 2015. According to their surveys, in March 
2015, 84% to 88% of the participants expressed their support of the accession of 
Crimea to Russia with 70% believing that it has brought more good than bad. 
More than 50% of the respondents did not believe in the presence of the Russian 
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troops in Ukraine and more than 70% believed that Russia was not taking any 
military action against Ukraine with about 24% thinking that the military actions 
in Donbass region will last for many years in a survey conducted on 15 March 
2015. In a separate survey conducted on the same date, 64% of the respondents 
answered that the EU is going to extend sanctions against Russia with 72% 
believing that Russia should continue its own policies disregarding the sanctions, 
however, little less than 50% felt positive about the end of retaliatory sanctions 
that were imposed by Russia in a form of a food import embargo, while 64% still 
felt positive in general that a food ban was an appropriate response for the 
sanctions imposed on Russia. Interestingly, 20% of the respondents experienced 
serious problems purchasing food since the food ban came into action. (Ukraine, 
Crimea, and the Sanctions 2015.) 
In other words, the overwhelming majority of ordinary Russian citizens support 
the position of their Government in respect to its foreign policy which means that 
the political rating of the Russia’s policy makers is not anywhere near low. Hence, 
although on the surface Russia seems a different state, the processes that happen 
inside the country share a number of essential similarities with the USSR which 
once again proves the practical ineffectiveness of the economic sanctions. 
5.1.3 Negative outcomes 
Although Russia was the target of international sanctions it was not the only 
country damages by their imposition. According to Finnish Customs, Russia was 
Finland’s largest trade partner in 2013, whereas in 2014 it was replaced by 
Germany (Country Statistics 2014). Finnish economy experienced a considerable 
impact of economic sanctions that affected its trade balance as it shares common 
border with Russia. Apart from the economic hardships experienced by a number 
of European states that have had close economic ties with Russia, the mutual 
intercultural exchange is now reducing to the Cold War era levels as Russia 
becomes more isolated from the rest of the world. Cultural exchange is a highly 
important factor as it determines the progress of the human development and 
plays an essential role in the democratization process in any country, particularly 
in Russia and the CIS.  
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In addition to the cooperation in cultural sphere, Russia was a very important 
member of the international resistance to the terrorism and now the security threat 
in a number of countries might rise as a result of a loss of such partner. Moreover, 
as Europe and the US distance themselves from Russia in terms of cooperation 
and international relations, the latter tends to find substitutes for them and 
therefore the role of China and India is believed to increase in Russia’s affairs. 
Lastly, recent statement of Greek Prime Minister that calls Europe to end its 
sanctions against Russia is believed to be an early sign of different position within 
the European Union in regard to economic sanctions (Walker 2015). For those 
very reasons it is necessary to propose alternative solutions for the problem. 
5.2 Trade restrictions within the Eurasian Economic Union 
On 29 May 2014 the presidents of Russia, Belarus and Kazakstan signed the 
Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. EEU serves for the purposes of regional 
economic integration between the former members of the USSR. Its fundamental 
principles are based on the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor 
whereas the primary purpose is the cooperation between the national economies of 
its member states. In the sense, it is the enhancement of the already existing 
Customs Union and Single Economic Space. Within the year 2014 Armenia and 
Kyrgyzstan have also become full members of the EEU. (About the Union 2014.) 
The structure of the Eurasian Economic Union is similar to the structure of the 
European Union and is centered on same principles. Therefore, as the Russian 
national economy is one of the integral parts of the EEU, other members’ 
economies also need to be taken into consideration. In other words, if, for 
example, France banned the import of Mexican apples, they could still enter the 
markets of other EU member states such as Germany where after certain 
operations they could be transported to France disguised as German apples which 
would undermine the effect on the fruit ban. Both Belarus and Kazakstan made it 
clear that the agricultural products ban is initiated by Russian Federation solely 
and will not affect either of them (Voronina, Lyutova 2014).  Although there have 
been no official statements in regard to the re-export of the banned products to 
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Russia via Belarus and Kazakstan, such possibility remains open due to the 
existence of Customs Union between the three partners.  
Alternative solution number one is the imposition of similar sanctions and trade 
restrictions on all members of the EEU. Whereas the other member states of the 
Eurasian Economic Union are not responsible for Russia’s foreign policy in any 
possible way, this alternative has got its own advantages. First of all, any 
sanctions imposed on Belarus, Kazakstan, Armenia or Kyrgyzstan will eventually 
result in the increasing political pressure on Russia from these independent 
republics within the framework of the EEU. Since the sanctions on Russia have 
been imposed the trade turnover with its Eurasian partners was expected to grow 
as Russia had to switch to alternative markets now, therefore, any changes in the 
composition of EEU, meaning the exit of one or more member states, could leave 
considerable impact on Russia’s trade. Secondly, the reduced economic growth 
together will possible inflation of the EEU member states will affect Russia’s 
economy as Belarus, Kazakstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, cut from the access to 
European and American financing will now request Russia for financial aid 
necessary for monetary intervention and stimulus of their national economies. 
Kazakstan in particular, where oil comprises 25% of country’s GDP and 60% of 
its exports (Blaauw 2011), will react more sensitively to the imposed sanctions.  
5.3 Sanctions on Russia’s private sector 
Second alternative proposes the addition of the following Russian companies to 
the existing sanctions list. In the metallurgy sector these are: the world’s largest 
aluminum producer Rusal (Sousa 2012), Norilsk Nickel which is the world’s 
leading producer of nickel and palladium (About Norilsk Nickel ), steel producer 
Severstal and the mining company Mechel. In the oil and gas industry these are 
the Tatneft and Bashneft. 
The importance of this second alternative is in the difference of its approach when 
compared with the sanctions that are already in action. In other words, although 
the EU and the US have already imposed sanctions on a number of large private 
businesses in Russia, this alternative does not only target the economic activity 
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alone, but is believed to have direct influence on the political decision making as 
well. 
First of all, as described in the subchapter 3.5, the relationship between the State 
and the Business plays an important role in both Russian politics and the 
economy. Moreover, due to the complexity of that relationship, it could be 
assumed that businessmen have a certain degree of influence on the political scene 
and the presence of certain names associated with large scale enterprises on the 
sanctions list only supports that assumption. Therefore, if direct economic 
sanctions are imposed on certain companies in Russian business world, their 
position towards the foreign policy of the Government might change with the 
decrease in the level of loyalty to the policy makers. As a result, there are solid 
chances that the certain degree of political pressure will appear leading to the 
political instability and reduced confidence in general. 
Secondly, the decision to sanction Russia’s private sector directly, might foster 
certain negative sentiments in the country’s business circle that could, in turn, 
make a decision to move their assets abroad in order to avoid financial losses in 
the medium term. Such move will definitely result in the increase outflow of 
capital that is believed to affect economy and its growth in the most negative way, 
taking into account the current situation and figures for the last year. Moreover, 
the companies of Russia’s private sector not only supply the Federal Budget with 
taxes, but also produce specific output such as gasoline, steel, aluminum and other 
materials essential for the country’s industrial growth and developments in the 
infrastructure. Therefore, the reduced output could affect the structure of the 
national economy and further diminish its performance in the long term. 
Lastly, imposition of direct sanctions on the two oil companies could be effective 
from the political rationale. According to Veles Capital the Government of the 
Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan owns the majority 34% stake in the Tatneft oil 
company (Analytics 2013). The Government of the Autnomous Republic of 
Bashkortostan, on the other hand, is believed to receive the 25% stake at the 
Bashneft oil company (Transfer of Bashneft to Bashkortostan to be completed no 
earlier than July 2015). Thus, taking into account the autonomous nature of the 
  
47 
 
two national republics, economic sanctions on them will first result in the reduced 
budget revenues and then could fuel certain moods within the two republics that 
pose a significant threat to the territorial integrity of Russian Federation. 
5.4 Visa restrictions for Russia’s middle class 
The 1
st
 clause of the Article 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states: 
“The bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in the Russian Federation 
shall be its multinational people” (First Section. Main Provisions). For that logical 
reason, it is completely correct to consider that the ordinary citizens of Russia 
bear in fact certain degree of responsibility for the actions of their Government. 
While most of the modern societies consist of the lower, middle and upper classes 
it is also correct to assume that targeting the lower classes is less humane in regard 
to their economic and social condition, whereas the middle class could be a 
suitable target for this third alternative.  
According to the European Commission, out of the total 33.8 million Russian 
tourists, 79% visited Europe in 2012 and Russia remains the fastest growing 
tourism market for Europe (Emerging markets 2014). In other words, Europe is 
the most popular destination for Russian travelers. Although for the world’s 
leading touristic locations, simplification of the visa application process and 
removal of administrative barriers seems customary, the introduction of new 
bureaucratic regulations with consequent denial of visit permits for the Russian 
residents seems practical from the political perspective. Such measure is humane 
to a great extent as tourism and travelling abroad is a luxurious good, however, it 
influences the public opinion towards the Government policies if the reason for 
such measures is explained clearly. One of the possible results will be the 
mounting public discontent among Russia’s middle class residents that might 
result in public protests and demonstrations that could influence the change of the 
Government’s foreign policy vector. 
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5.5 Alternatives for the Turkish Stream 
Turkish Stream pipeline project is expected to transport natural gas from Russia’s 
shore to Turkey passing under the Black Sea and is believed to satisfy Russia’s 
desire of using transportation route alternative to the one via Ukraine to its 
European markets (Tinas 2015). One of the negative implications for the Turkish 
side could the increased dependence on Russian gas; however, it seems unclear 
what instruments could the EU and the US use in order to influence the fate of the 
project. This thesis does not offer a clear algorithm for the implementation of the 
fourth alternative solution. Nevertheless, if, for any possible reason, the project is 
shut or suspended for an uncertain period of time it can be advantageous from the 
political perspective for the following reasons. 
First of all, in the light of a USD 400 billion gas deal between Russia and China 
on the supply of 30 billion cubic meters of gas annually signed in November 2014 
(Paton, Guo 2014), limiting Russia’s access to European market could result in 
the increasing dependence of its gas industry on the Chinese market. Hence, 
Chinese political and financial influence over the Russian Federation is believed 
to increase as well. With the Chinese economy growing and its weight on the 
global political arena increasing, for Russia it will for sure pose certain threats 
both demographically and geopolitically as the immigration levels together with 
the potential Chinese investment into the country could rise as well. Secondly, the 
end of the Turkish Stream project could result in the shift of the attention to 
another pipeline project named TANAP. Trans Anatolian Pipeline will bring 
Azerbaijani natural gas extracted in the Caspian Sea via Georgia to Turkey where 
after reaching its European territories it transport is further to European markets 
via Trans Adriatic Pipeline (Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project 2015). 
Moreover, the strengthening position of Azerbaijan as a supplier on the global gas 
market could result in the entrance of new players to the TANAP system. 
Kazakstan, that shares its Caspian maritime border with Azerbaijan, might be 
interested in the cooperation in this project by offering its own gas supplies 
originating in the very same sea. Thus, two of the former Soviet states that are 
located in the region of Russia’s geopolitical interest become more independent in 
terms of gas sale and Georgia becomes a transit country. For the Russian 
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Federation such developments mean decreasing influence in the region and 
limited opportunities in the pursuit of their own gas transport agenda.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
This last chapter of the thesis is based on the results that answer the research 
question. In contrast with the subchapters of the previous chapter this part lists 
potential disadvantages of the proposed alternative solutions. 
6.1 Answers for research questions 
In general, the thesis tends to evaluate factors both internally and externally that 
influence the decision making that shapes the foreign policy of Russian 
Federation. The scope of this thesis is limited to the predominant use of internet 
sources due the fact that this issue is relatively new, as the events have begun in 
the spring 2014, and, therefore, there is lack of related published literature. 
Nevertheless, all the proposed alternatives are practical and implementable for the 
reason that they follow the general line of the already imposed economic 
sanctions and do not neglect the principles of humanity and peace. Moreover, this 
thesis succeeded in answering the research question properly with a certain degree 
of validity. 
Table 6 summarizes the main findings in regard to the main research question as 
well as the answers to the sub-questions. 
TABLE 6. Answers on research questions 
Question Answer 
Main Research Question: 
What measures need to be taken in 
order to influence the decision making 
in regard to Russia’s foreign policy? 
The measures that influence the factors 
that are responsible for such vital 
parameters as national security, 
territorial integrity, political rating, 
public support, volume of money in 
circulation in the economic cycle and 
the infrastructure of energy complex. 
Sub-question 1: The high degree of historical 
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To what extent is the trade with the 
Eurasian partners important? 
cooperation and interconnectedness of 
national economies together with 
political cooperation in the security 
sphere. 
Sub-question 2: 
What is the role of Russia’s private 
sector from the political and economic 
perspective? 
The importance of private sector in 
respect to the relationship between 
State and Business, combined with the 
political and economic power 
associated with the business elite. 
Sub-question 3: 
What is the importance of the middle 
class in the formation of public opinion 
Absolute degree of dependence of the 
public opinion and Government support 
from the middle class in regards to the 
political rating of the ruling party. 
Sub-question 4: 
What is the importance of Russia’s gas 
transporting infrastructure from the 
political perspective? 
Extent of the capacity of the existing 
gas transporting network infrastructure 
and its contribution to the balance of 
political power in Eurasia 
 
6.2 Suggestions for further research 
Based on the conclusion of this thesis, one suggestion for further research is 
given. As the main objective of this study was in proposing the alternative 
solutions that could influence the vector of Russia’s foreign policy, the role of its 
citizens is therefore an important factor that needs to be taken into consideration. 
While this study lacks any primary data and qualitative research method 
represents only a small portion of it, it is suggested that the further research could 
be done in field of the exploration of public opinion towards the economic 
condition of the country and their standards of living in Russia in the end of 2015, 
given that sanctions stay active and political situation doesn’t change. The related 
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data is to be collected by the author in person via the interviews and surveys. The 
subsequent analysis is to be conducted qualitatively.  
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7 SUMMARY 
The economic sanctions by the US and the EU were imposed on Russia in 
response to the annexation of Crimea and the continuing destabilization of 
Ukraine. However, the situation has not changed ever since as Crimea remains a 
federal district of Russian Federation and military actions in the Eastern Ukraine 
still continue. Therefore, the goal of this thesis was to generate alternative 
solutions for this problem. 
The deductive approach, together with the combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods, with clear prevalence of the former research method, has 
been used throughout the thesis. The data was collected solely from secondary 
sources, particularly: books, articles, reports and the internet. The research lacked 
primary data due to the newness of the subject and difficulties in conducting 
surveys and interviews. 
The essential framework that was used for the research in this thesis consisted of 
the three key parts one of which were the analysis of Russia’s national economy 
with emphasis on its structural composition and its establishment within the last 
24 years after the dissolution of the USSR and the adoption of market based 
economic system. It was followed by the empirical analysis of Russia’s economic 
performance, exchange rate, and oil industry and capital movement after the 
sanctions were imposed. 
After the empirical analysis, it was concluded that the already imposed sanctions 
were not practically effective as, regardless of the technical success achieved, the 
initial purpose that was behind their imposition was not fulfilled. Therefore, the 
several alternative solutions were suggested for the implementation, with focus in 
such areas as the relationship with the trade partners within Eurasian Economic 
Union and the political influence of Russia’s private sector. Other alternatives 
were the certain changes in EU’s immigration policy and political pressure on 
Russia’s gas transport infrastructural project. 
The main objectives of this thesis were reached as the research question was 
answered correctly and in a proper manner. One of the limitations of this thesis 
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was the lack of primary data and the other was the unavailability of the academic 
books in regard to this problem. Finally, the author suggests a further study to be 
done in the sphere of the public opinion in regard to the economic performance of 
the country and their standards of living.  
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